Innovators can protect their technical innovation with a number of different legal instruments. Usually these instruments are mutually exclusive and innovators have to decide which means of protection would be in their best interest. Also, on a larger scale, policy makers have to decide which type of intellectual property rights are best suited to promote the development of innovation for society, and then provide regulation to incentive broad use accordingly. Below chart summarizes some of the choices that innovators have. Choosing between seeking trade secret protection, which requires secrecy on the one hand, and patent protection, which requires disclosure of the invention through the patent office, is also referred to as ÅgOpen-Close StrategyÅh. If an innovator chooses patent protection for a valuable invention, he will again have to make choices how to exploit the patent and to which degree he will make the patent available to third parties.    

The incentive to use patents or trade secrets relies to some degree on their enforceability in case of infringement. A significant part of my research focusses on developing a balanced framework of enforcement rules. The owner of a valid patent or trade secret should be able to effectively enforce their rights in court proceedings if there is a likelihood of infringement. At the same time, a court system should not be decked in favor of the right holder, as such a setup may encourage overly excessive enforcement which may have a chilling effect on competition. As a comparative intellectual property law scholar, I am analyzing the evolving enforcement systems of different leading jurisdictions such as the US, UK, Germany, India, or China, and develop suggestions on what kind of solutions can be implemented in Japan or in other jurisdictions in light of local or national civil procedure rules and other factors relevant for enforcement.